Earnings Guidance: How Should Companies Interact with the Market? by Dolvin, Steven D.
Butler University
Digital Commons @ Butler University
Scholarship and Professional Work - Business College of Business
1-2009
Earnings Guidance: How Should Companies
Interact with the Market?
Steven D. Dolvin
Butler University, sdolvin@butler.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cob_papers
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business at Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarship and Professional Work - Business by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more
information, please contact fgaede@butler.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dolvin, Steven D., "Earnings Guidance: How Should Companies Interact with the Market?" (2009). Scholarship and Professional Work -
Business. Paper 36.
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cob_papers/36
January/February 2009 – BizVoice/Indiana Chamber 27
Finance
The Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 afforded firms enhanced protection from lawsuits associated with the release of earnings forecasts and other material 
information. As expected, following the passage of this Act, the 
number of companies providing earnings guidance increased 
dramatically. For example, in 2007 approximately two-thirds 
of publicly traded firms engaged in such activity. 
 More recently, however, the trend has reversed. Firms 
such as Pfizer, Intel, Motorola, AT&T, Coca-Cola, Google and 
McDonalds have eliminated their earnings guidance. This 
change has been supported by well-known investors like 
Warren Buffett, as well as leading industry groups such as the 
CFA Institute and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
 Opponents of earnings guidance cite various reasons for 
their position. Most importantly, the belief is that earnings 
forecasts entice both firm managers and investors to take a 
short-term view of the company, which comes at the expense 
of long-term value creation. For example, with these official 
targets in mind, executives might be prone to manage earnings 
and possibly even forego important long-term investments or 
research and development expenditures for fear of the market 
response associated with a shortfall to target. 
 From an investor perspective, earnings targets may 
indirectly reduce the extent of analysis performed, as investors 
are tempted to overlook the complexities of the business and 
focus on a single number. The result is an increase in volatility 
for the stock as a short-term divergence from earnings 
guidance is given more weight than the long-term implication 
of the root cause of the deviation. 
Estimate accuracy
 Nonetheless, firms are often hesitant to eliminate guidance 
simply for fear of backlash from the investment community – 
and stock analysts in particular. Analysts are fond of guidance, 
as it provides a baseline for their own forecasts, essentially 
making their jobs easier. Some investors thus worry that 
analyst estimates would be less accurate without the guidance, 
thereby inducing greater stock price volatility as investors 
respond to actual earnings reports that deviate substantially 
from the imprecise analyst estimates. 
 So, the question remains: Should firms eliminate earnings 
guidance? Unfortunately, the debate, as detailed above, typically 
focuses on only the extreme positions to this question, leaving 
no middle ground from which both companies and investors 
could benefit. Yet, it seems that a simple yes or no decision is 
not the optimal outcome. For example, published studies find 
that price volatility subsides after companies eliminate 
earnings guidance, suggesting that opponents of earnings 
guidance are correct. 
 However, these studies also note 
that this result is particularly 
significant during periods of relative 
stability in firm/market performance 
(and even more so for larger firms). 
Thus, smaller firms and those 
experiencing turbulent times may 
promote price stability by providing 
earnings guidance. Similarly, the 
concern that analyst estimates would 
be inaccurate may be correct; 
however, studies show that the propensity of firms to pre-
announce (outside of typical earnings guidance) is correlated 
to the accuracy of the published estimates. Thus, eliminating 
earnings guidance does not suggest abolishing all material 
information or discussion of general (or even specific) earnings 
drivers.
Going the longer route
 There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to this issue. But, 
there is evidence that points to what the probable outcome 
may look like. Although analysts like guidance, surveys suggest 
most may actually prefer longer forecasts, such as one-year EPS 
(earnings per share) targets. This seems to be consistent with 
the feelings of leading CFOs. Further, many participants seem 
to agree that a single earnings number is not necessary if a 
sufficient discussion of key performance drivers is provided. 
So, over time, earnings guidance may progress to a more 
detailed discussion of firm performance and critical value 
creation drivers, with actual earnings ranges given on a longer-
term (yearly) basis. 
 The particular issues that need addressed are not the same 
for every company; thus, each company needs to develop a 
disclosure policy that is relevant for the characteristics of the 
particular business and industry. In doing so, however, firms 
need to make sure that internal measures are structured to 
match accordingly. For example, elimination of earnings 
guidance would not reduce the incentive to focus on short-
term results if executive compensation is directly tied to quarterly 
earnings. So, crafting a strategy of market interaction requires 
detailed thought and integration across more departments than 
simply investor relations.
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